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</div>
## Harden Github-hosted and self-hosted runners
## Table of Contents
- [Harden GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners](#harden-github-hosted-and-self-hosted-runners)
- [3,500+ open source projects use Harden-Runner](#3500-open-source-projects-use-harden-runner)
- [Trusted By](#trusted-by)
- [Case Studies](#case-studies)
- [Why use Harden-Runner](#why-use-harden-runner)
- [Getting Started](#getting-started)
- [GitHub-Hosted Runners](#github-hosted-runners)
- [Hands-On Tutorials](#hands-on-tutorials)
- [Support for Self-Hosted Runners and Private Repositories](#support-for-self-hosted-runners-and-private-repositories)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2)
- [Features at a glance](#features-at-a-glance)
- [View outbound network traffic](#view-outbound-network-traffic)
- [View outbound HTTPS traffic](#view-outbound-https-traffic)
- [Detect anomalous outbound network traffic](#detect-anomalous-outbound-network-traffic)
- [Filter outbound network traffic to allowed endpoints](#filter-outbound-network-traffic-to-allowed-endpoints)
- [View recommendation for minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions](#view-recommendation-for-minimum-github_token-permissions)
- [View the name and path of every file written during the build process](#view-the-name-and-path-of-every-file-written-during-the-build-process)
- [View process names and arguments](#view-process-names-and-arguments)
- [Detect tampering of source code during build](#detect-tampering-of-source-code-during-build)
- [Run your job without sudo access](#run-your-job-without-sudo-access)
- [Get security alerts](#get-security-alerts)
- [Discussions](#discussions)
- [How does it work?](#how-does-it-work)
- [GitHub-Hosted Runners](#github-hosted-runners-1)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners-1)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2-1)
- [Limitations](#limitations)
- [GitHub-Hosted Runners](#github-hosted-runners-2)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners-2)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2-2)
## Harden GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
Harden-Runner provides network egress filtering and runtime security for GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners.
@ -21,31 +56,45 @@ Learn how Harden-Runner works through the video below, which shows how it detect
<a href="https://youtu.be/Yz72qAOrN9s" target="_blank"><img src="images/case-study-thumbnail1.png" alt="Harden-Runner detected supply chain attack in a Google open-source project" title="This case study video shows how StepSecurity Harden-Runner detected a CI/CD supply chain attack in real-time in Googles open-source project Flank"></a>
## 3,000+ open source projects use Harden-Runner
## 3,500+ open source projects use Harden-Runner
Harden-Runner is trusted by leading open source projects and enterprises to secure their CI/CD pipelines.
### Trusted by
| [![CISA](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/18539691?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/cisagov/skeleton-generic/actions/runs/7588528684) | [![Microsoft](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6154722?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/microsoft/ebpf-for-windows/actions/runs/7587031851) | [![Google](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/2810941?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/GoogleCloudPlatform/functions-framework-ruby/actions/runs/7576989995) | [![DataDog](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/365230?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/DataDog/stratus-red-team/actions/runs/7446169664) | [![Intel](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/17888862?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/intel/cve-bin-tool/actions/runs/7590975903) | [![Kubernetes](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/36015203?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/kubernetes-sigs/cluster-api-provider-azure/actions/runs/7591172950) | [![Node.js](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/9950313?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/nodejs/node/actions/runs/7591405720) | [![AWS](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/2232217?s=60&v=4)](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/aws/aperf/actions/runs/7631366761) |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **CISA**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/cisagov/skeleton-generic/actions/runs/7588528684) | **Microsoft**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/microsoft/ebpf-for-windows/actions/runs/7587031851) | **Google**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/GoogleCloudPlatform/functions-framework-ruby/actions/runs/7576989995) | **DataDog**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/DataDog/stratus-red-team/actions/runs/7446169664) | **Intel**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/intel/cve-bin-tool/actions/runs/7590975903) | **Kubernetes**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/kubernetes-sigs/cluster-api-provider-azure/actions/runs/7591172950) | **Node.js**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/nodejs/node/actions/runs/7591405720) | **AWS**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/aws/aperf/actions/runs/7631366761) |
## Why
### Case Studies
- [Harden-Runner Detects CI/CD Supply Chain Attack in Googles Open-Source Project Flank](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/flank)
- [Kapiche secures their GitHub Actions software supply chain with Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/kapiche)
- [Arcjet Enhances CI/CD Security with Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/arcjet)
## Why use Harden-Runner
There are two main threats from compromised workflows, dependencies, and build tools in a CI/CD environment:
1. Exfiltration of CI/CD credentials and source code
2. Tampering of source code, dependencies, or artifacts during the build to inject a backdoor
Harden-Runner monitors process, file, and network activity to:
| | Countermeasure | Prevent Security Breach |
| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1. | Monitor and block outbound network traffic at the DNS, HTTPS (Layer 7), and network layers (Layers 3 and 4) to prevent exfiltration of code and CI/CD credentials | To prevent the [Codecov breach](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md) scenario |
| 2. | Detect if source code is being tampered during the build process to inject a backdoor | To detect the [XZ Utils](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/analysis-of-backdoored-xz-utils-build-process-with-harden-runner) and [SolarWinds incident](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/TamperingDuringBuild.md) scenario |
| 3. | Detect poisoned workflows and compromised dependencies | To detect [Dependency confusion](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#dependency-confusion-attacks) and [Malicious dependencies](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#compromised-dependencies) |
| | Countermeasure | Prevent Security Breach |
| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1. | Monitor and block outbound network traffic at the DNS, HTTPS (Layer 7), and network layers (Layers 3 and 4) to prevent exfiltration of code and CI/CD credentials | To prevent the [Codecov breach](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md) scenario |
| 2. | Detect if source code is being tampered during the build process to inject a backdoor | To detect the [XZ Utils](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/analysis-of-backdoored-xz-utils-build-process-with-harden-runner) and [SolarWinds incident](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/TamperingDuringBuild.md) scenarios |
| 3. | Detect poisoned workflows and compromised dependencies that exhibit suspicious behavior | To detect [Dependency confusion](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#dependency-confusion-attacks) and [Malicious dependencies](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#compromised-dependencies) scenarios |
| 4. | Determine minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions by monitoring HTTPS calls to GitHub APIs | To set [minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions]() to reduce the impact of exfiltration |
## How
## Getting Started
### GitHub-Hosted Runners
1. Add the `step-security/harden-runner` GitHub Action to your GitHub Actions workflow file as the first step in each job.
1. Add the `step-security/harden-runner` GitHub Action to your GitHub Actions workflow file as the first step in each job. You can automate this step by pasting your workflow in the [StepSecurity online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/secureworkflow).
```yaml
steps:
@ -72,7 +121,7 @@ Harden-Runner monitors process, file, and network activity to:
<img src="images/recommended-policy1.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
## Hands-On Tutorials
#### Hands-On Tutorials
You can use [GitHub Actions Goat](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat) to try Harden-Runner. You only need a GitHub Account and a web browser.
@ -81,7 +130,7 @@ Hands-on Tutorials for GitHub Actions Runtime Security:
1. [Filter Egress Network Traffic](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Solutions/RestrictOutboundTraffic.md)
2. [Detect File Tampering](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Solutions/MonitorSourceCode.md)
## Support for Self-Hosted Runners and Private Repositories
### Support for Self-Hosted Runners and Private Repositories
Hardening for self-hosted runners and GitHub-hosted runners used in private repositories is supported with a commercial license. Check out the [documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/stepsecurity-platform/billing) for more details.
@ -91,7 +140,7 @@ Hardening for self-hosted runners and GitHub-hosted runners used in private repo
Read this [case study on how Kapiche uses Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/kapiche/) to improve software supply chain security in their private repositories.
### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
#### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
> Explore demo workflows using self-hosted ARC Runner and ARC Harden-Runner [here](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/enable-runtime-security-arc).
@ -99,21 +148,21 @@ Actions Runner Controller (ARC) is a Kubernetes operator that orchestrates self-
- Instead of adding the Harden-Runner GitHub Action in each job, you'll need to install the ARC Harden-Runner daemonset on your Kubernetes cluster.
- Upon installation, the ARC Harden-Runner daemonset monitors all jobs run on the cluster; you do NOT need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to each job for `audit` mode. You do need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to jobs where you want to enable `block` mode.
- Please email support@stepsecurity.io for instructions on how to install the ARC-Harden-Runner daemonset on your Kubernetes cluster.
- The instructions for installing the ARC-Harden-Runner daemonset are shown in the dashboard. To enable access to these instructions, please email support@stepsecurity.io.
### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
#### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
> Explore demo workflows using self-hosted VM Runners and Harden-Runner [here](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/enable-runtime-security-vm).
- Instead of adding the Harden-Runner GitHub Action in each job, you'll need to install the Harden-Runner agent on your runner image (e.g. AMI). This is typically done using packer or as a post-install step when using the https://github.com/philips-labs/terraform-aws-github-runner project to setup runners.
- The Harden-Runner agent monitors all jobs run on the VM, both ephemeral and persistent runners are supported; you do NOT need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to each job for `audit` mode. You do need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to jobs where you want to enable `block` mode.
- Please email support@stepsecurity.io for instructions on how to install the Harden-Runner agent on your self-hosted VM runners. This agent is different than the one used for GitHub-hosted runners.
- The instructions for installing the Harden-Runner agent on your self-hosted VM runners are shown in the dashboard. To enable access to these instructions, please email support@stepsecurity.io. This agent is different than the one used for GitHub-hosted runners.
## Features at a glance
For details, check out the documentation at https://docs.stepsecurity.io
### 📶 View outbound network traffic
### View outbound network traffic
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
@ -123,21 +172,21 @@ Harden-Runner monitors all outbound traffic from each job at the DNS and network
- For self-hosted runners, no changes are needed to workflow files to monitor egress traffic
- A filtering (block) egress policy is suggested in the insights page based on the current and past job runs
### 🌐 View outbound HTTPS traffic
### View outbound HTTPS traffic
> Applies to GitHub-hosted and self-hosted VM runners
> Applies to GitHub-hosted and self-hosted VM runners
Harden-Runner can monitor outbound HTTPS requests. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- HTTPS events are monitored using eBPF (no MITM proxy is used)
- If a HTTP PUT/ POST/ PATCH call is made to `github.com` or `api.github.com` hosts to a HTTP Path with a different organization than where the workflow is running, the call is marked as anomalous
- As of now, only HTTPS calls to `github.com` and `api.github.com` hosts are monitoried.
- If a HTTP PUT/ POST/ PATCH call is made to GitHub APIs to a HTTP Path with a different organization than where the workflow is running, the call is marked as anomalous
- As of now, only HTTPS calls to `github.com`, `api.github.com`, `*.pkg.github.com`, and `ghcr.io` hosts are monitoried.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/https-events.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### ⚠️ Detect anomalous outbound network traffic
### Detect anomalous outbound network traffic
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
@ -146,8 +195,7 @@ Harden-Runner creates a baseline of outbound traffic for each job during the fir
- After the baseline is created, any new outbound destinations are marked as anomalous in the insights page
- You can view the list of all anomalous outbound network traffic in the `Runtime detections` page on the dashboard
### 🚦 Filter outbound network traffic to allowed endpoints
### Filter outbound network traffic to allowed endpoints
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
@ -161,7 +209,22 @@ Once allowed endpoints are set in the policy in the workflow file, or in the [Po
<img src="images/blocked-outbound-call-3.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### 📋 View the name and path of every file written during the build process
### View recommendation for minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
> Applies to GitHub-hosted runners
Harden-Runner monitors outbound HTTPS requests using eBPF and uses the PATHs and VERBs of these HTTPS calls to recommend the minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions for each job in your workflow. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- GITHUB_TOKEN is an automatically generated secret used to authenticate to GitHub APIs from GitHub Actions workflows.
- Harden-Runner can monitor the VERBs (e.g., `GET`, `POST`) and PATHs (e.g., `/repos/owner/repo/issues`) for calls made to the GitHub APIs from the runner.
- Each GitHub Actions API call requires a corresponding GITHUB_TOKEN permission. For instance, a GET request to the `/repos/org/repo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` endpoint requires the `contents: read` permission.
- The recommendation for the minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions are show in the `Recommendations` tab.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/token-perms-recommendation.png" alt="View recommendation for minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions" >
</p>
### View the name and path of every file written during the build process
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
@ -175,21 +238,21 @@ View the name and path of every file that was written during the build process.
<img src="images/file-write-events.png" alt="View the name and path of every file written during the build process" >
</p>
### 🔄 View process names and arguments
### View process names and arguments
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
View process names, PIDs, and process arguments. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- Harden-Runner tracks every process that is run during the build process.
- Clicking on any file reveals a list of processes that wrote to it.
- You can walk up the process tree and view process arguments to understand the build process and detect suspicious activity.
- Clicking on any process ID (PID) in the network events, file events, or HTTPS events shows the process that caused the event, along with the process arguments.
- You can walk up the process tree by clicking `View Parent Process` to understand the build process and detect suspicious activity.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/process-events-3.png" alt="View process names and arguments" >
</p>
### 📁 Detect tampering of source code during build
### Detect tampering of source code during build
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
@ -204,7 +267,7 @@ Harden-Runner monitors file writes and can detect if a file is overwritten.
<img src="images/file-events.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### 🚫 Run your job without sudo access
### Run your job without sudo access
> Applies to GitHub-hosted runners
@ -215,7 +278,7 @@ GitHub-hosted runner uses passwordless sudo for running jobs.
recommendation to disable sudo in the insights page
- When you set `disable-sudo` to `true`, the job steps run without sudo access to the GitHub-hosted Ubuntu VM
### 🔔 Get security alerts
### Get security alerts
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners

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